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O ver the years, Hossein Askari has provided some of the most accurate assessments of 
economic developments in the Middle East. In 
many respects, Middle East Oil Exporters represents 
the culmination of that research. Here, Askari int
tegrates many previously developed themes into a 
comprehensive framework capable of providing 
deeper insights as to the causes of the dire plight 
facing many of region’s key economies. 
The volume is built around three related 
themes. First, Askari provides a detailed picture of 
the economic structure and a critical survey of the 
recent economic performance of the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region. The focus is 
primarily on the large oiltexporting nations – Iran, 
Iraq and Saudi Arabia, with somewhat less attent
tion devoted to several Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries – Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. 
To show how the patterns of development of these 
countries are unique in the developing world he 
makes a number of comparisons of their patterns 
of growth with a sample of nontoil countries of 
the region (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and 
Tunisia), together 
with an approprit
ate group of count
tries from outside 
the region (Chile, 
Korea, Malaysia 
and Singapore).
Second, he presents a strong and uncomprot
mising argument about what these countries must 
do, and what the West must do to improve their 
economic performance and social fabric.
Askari’s third theme centers on the social, 
economic and political implications of Islamic 
doctrine. Significantly, his interpretation of Islamt
ic teaching is dramatically different from the cont
ventional picture propagated today by interested 
parties inside and outside the Middle East. 
These three components are then woven into 
a tight framework focused on the problems created 
by abundant oil resources. The question is simple: 
Why has oil been more of a curse than a blessing 
for the region? In contrast to many other works on 
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the reasons for economic and social failure in the 
Middle East are far deeper than simple shortcomt
ings in the quality of economic policies adopted, 
availability of financial resources and governance. 
Instead, political, legal, social, cultural and relit
gious factors, regional conflicts and instability, and 
external meddling in the region have also shaped 
the economic landscape. Specifically, Askari bet
lieves that the explanation for the region’s undert
performance lies in what has happened in the ret
gion since World War II and especially over the 
past 30 to 35 years.  
His analysis leads to the logical conclusion 
that there can be no sustained economic growth, 
development and prosperity in the Middle East 
without peace and stability. On the other hand, he 
notes there can be no stability without economic 
prosperity.  Unfortunately, the major powers int
stead of supporting social, political and economic 
progress have made matters worse by focusing on 
their own narrow shorttterm interests and at times 
even fueling conflicts. (p.)
While extremely critical of the role played 
by the western powers, Askari admits much of the 
region’s problems can be simply traced to oil. Pet
troleum became the crutch to avoid policy reform 
and to keep unpopular governments in power. 
“Oil has destroyed the work ethic of the region, 
fueled corruption and poisoned the cultural and 
social fabric of society. Islam has been invoked to 
garner legitimacy for illegitimate regimes and to 
gain support where support has not been earned. 
Islamic teachings have been perverted and convet
niently adapted and adopted to support the dict
tator of the day, with concessions to the religious 
establishment to gain their backing.”(p.t).
From a purely economic perspective, a ret
sponsible oil policy is easy to conceptualize.  Since 
oil is not a renewable resource, using oil revenues, 
as many countries do simply to subsidize current 
consumption is a way of cheating future generat
tions out of their share of the natural inheritance. 
Instead an adequate share of current revenues 
should be invested in earning assets. These will 
increasingly substitute for oil as it runs out or bet
comes high cost and less profitable or faces comt
petition from alternative fuels. The generations to 
come in a posttoil future thus share indirectly in 
the country’s natural legacy.
It is in this regard that Islamic practices prot
vide one of Askari’s main ironies – by simply folt
lowing Islam’s main teachings, the countries could 
have avoided many of their selftinflicted problems. 
As Askari notes, the clear message of Islam is that 
all current and future citizens must reap the same 
real benefit from resource depletion. Oil resources 
must thus be used in a just and efficient manner. 
One possible solution would be to give each memt
ber of the current and future generations a sum of 
money with the same real purchasing power by dot
ing the following: () placing all oil revenues into 
a fund; () investing the resources of the fund; (3) 
issuing a check to every citizen from this fund (the 
amount calculated in a conservative manner and 
subject to change annually in order to ensure the 
same real benefit to all future generations); and (4) 
allowing the government to borrow up to a fixed 
maximum percentage of the fund at an annual cost 
to be paid to the fund. 
In addition to the creation of oil funds for the 
direct distribution of revenues to the population, 
Askari feels governments must undertake a numt
ber of reforms to escape the vicious circles entrapt
ping progress. Here he directs most of his attention 
to the larger countries. To achieve more dynamic 
economic performance and sustain growth during 
periods of slack oil markets these countries need to 
adopt policy packages built around the principles 
laid down by the World Bank and IMF (the sot
called Washington Consensus).  
A partial list of reforms would include relaxt
ing economic controls, reducing the role of govt
ernment and creating an environment where the 
private sector can thrive. This would entail elimit
nation (or at least a dramatic reduction) of explicit 
and implicit subsidies, effective privatization of 
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state enterprises (including commercial banks and 
foundations in the case of Iran), elimination of ret
maining price and financial controls,  creation of 
an effective and equitable tax system, reduction in 
tariffs and nonttariff barriers to promote domestic 
competition. Of course, many of these would be 
politically difficult in the short run. Historically 
the oiltexporters have backed off of them during 
times of abundant oil revenues.
The book ends with an ominous warning (p. 
333t334):
The governments of these larger countries 
have little choice. If they do not institute reforms 
more rapidly, they will be swept aside by growt
ing discontent among the needy and the unemt
ployed, especially the young. To have a reasont
able chance of success governments must adopt 
policy reforms and ensure during the transition 
phase the majority of their citizens (the less wellt
off economically) see and believe themselves to 
be better of than before the reforms. This will 
require a welltdesigned safety net based on Ist
lamic principles (affording everyone necessities 
in food, shelter, healthcare and education).
Writing books on the Middle East is a hazt
ardous endeavor. Often they become caught up in 
events and dated before their ink has had a chance 
to dry. In a sense Middle East Oil Exporters suffers 
the same fate.  Most of the data forming the basis 
of Askari’s analysis ends at 00. The progress made 
during the prolonged oil boom continuing to transt
form the region does not enter into his assessment. 
How would the book differ if it was written 
in light of recent developments in the worldtwide 
oil markets?  No doubt Askari would contend that 
all the current influx of revenues has done is cont
ceal the problems carefully documented throught
out his study – these impediments to growth and 
development will again surface once the boom 
subsides. Simply put, the dire warnings noted 
above still hold. This is certainly true of Iraq and 
Iran, although the Iranians are making some progt
ress in reducing gasoline subsidies and there is talk 
of privatization of some of the state enterprises. 
An oil fund has been set up, although far from the 
model suggested by Askari.
Saudi Arabia may be a different case – the 
Kingdom has apparently learned from its past 
mistakes and while economic and political reforms 
appear on hold, there is more of a concerted effort 
to better manage the influx of wealth. The Dubai 
miracle and perhaps a similar boom underway in 
Qatar would have to be addressed – does Dubai’s 
dramatic success show that a little oil may be bett
ter than an abundant amount? Or, does it repret
sent a nontWashington Consensus, new wave of 
the future perhaps to be widely emulated by the 
other oil exporters?
